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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
QUESTION PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Young's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary? This Court reviews 
"a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion 
standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact 
made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996). 
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with . . . 
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
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correctness." Id. This issue was preserved in Mr. Young's motion to withdraw guilty plea, 
and at a hearing on the motion held November 1, 2007. (R. 375 & 382). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Ernest Young appeals from the judgment, sentence, and conviction of the Foruth 
District Court entered after the court denied his motions to withdraw his guilty plea. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Ernest Young was charged by Information filed in Third District Court and 
transferred to the Fourth District Court on May 26, 2006 with two counts of Influencing 
Retaliating or Threatening a Judge, both Third Degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-8-316 (R. 4). The charges arose from defendant making phone calls on 
May 5, 2006 to judges of the Third District making various threats. The threats were left 
on the court's voicemail system. (Pre-Sentence Report, R. 348). 
On July 14, 2007 the state filed a Petition to Inquire into Defendant's Competency 
was filed. (R. 55). The alienists filed reports with the court recommending a finding that 
the defendant was not competent to proceed. Defendant objected to such a finding and 
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requested a hearing. The formal competency hearing was held on October 26, 2006. Dr. 
Wootton and Dr. Nielson testified and recommended that defendant be found not 
competent to proceed. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Stott found the defendant 
not competent and remanded him to the custody of the Utah State Mental Hospital for 
treatment. (R. 182, 184 & 191). Defendant attempted to pursue and Interlocutory Appeal 
of this ruling. On December 21, 2006 The Utah Court of Appeals denied the 
Interlocutory Appeal. (R. 245). 
Several Competency Review hearings were held. On May 31, 2007 the court 
determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and a Preliminary Hearing was 
scheduled for June 14, 2007. (R. 344). 
On June 14, 2007, while being represented by Mr. David Stewart, a Preliminary 
Hearing was waived before Judge Stott. Mr. Young executed a Statement of Defendant 
in Support of Guilty Plea and Young entered a guilty plea to Count One. Count Two was 
dismissed. (R. 357). Exhibit C 
Sentencing was scheduled for Mr. Young on July 26, 2007. Prior to sentencing Mr. 
Young advised his counsel and the court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. 
Stewart filed a Withdrawal of Counsel. (R. 363). 
On September 20, 2007 a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea was filed on behalf 
of Defendant. (R. 375). The basis for the motion was as follows: One, Ineffective 
Counsel. Two, defendant's allegation that he did not fully understand his rights and the 
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consequences of entering the plea. Three, that the court failed to strictly comply with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The hearing on the Motion to Withdraw the Plea was held on November 1, 2007. 
At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that, "I read the 
material that both sides have filed. I believe based upon all of that information, that the 
defendant's rights with respect to Rule 11 have been complied with. I believe that 
considering the discussions had on the record, and the statement in support of plea, that 
the rule requirements and the case law requirements with respect to insuring that the 
defendant knows of his rights and understands the consequences of his decision to plead 
guilty have been satisfied, and that the plea was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly given. 
With that, what to you wan to do with respect to sentencing now?" (Transcript of hearing 
held 11/1/07 pg. 3). 
On December 3, 2007 counsel for Mr. Young filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth 
District Court (R. not in appeal record, held in purple file at 4 District Court). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Facts from Entry of Plea on June 14, 2007. 
At the Entry of Plea hearing the trial court asked Mr. Young's counsel, David 
Stewart, if he believed Mr. Young understood the information in the Statement in 
Advance of Plea as to his constitutional rights he is giving up and the potential sentence. 
Mr. Stewart said yes and then the court asked Mr. Young if he agreed to which he replied 
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that he did. (Transcript of hearing held 6/14/07 pg. 3). The court asked Mr. Young if he 
understood that he was giving up his constitutional rights as set forth in the document and 
that he would have no further grounds to contest the charges. To which Mr. Young stated, 
"That's correct, the file's not going to get any bigger your honor." (Transcript of hearing 
held 11/1/07 pg. 3). The court stated that it is not how big the file is going to get but, 
"The ultimate question is when does the case get resolved." Mr. Young was given the 
opportunity to ask any more questions and the only question he had was about the case 
being transferred to Mental Health Court as a condition of the sentence. When the plea 
was entered counsel for the state, counsel for the defendant and the defendant were 
seeking to have the sentence imposed include as a condition of probation that Mr. Young 
would enter into and complete mental health court. (Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07 
pg. 4). The court was clear that the sentence to be imposed was up to the court and 
although the court would consider input a term in the Utah State Prison could be imposed. 
(Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07 pg. 5). The court did not make any independent 
inquiry into the defendant's understanding of just what his constitutional rights were or 
what the term "constitutional rights" meant to him. No factual basis for the charges was 
stated on the record. 
C. Facts from Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Pleas on November 1,2007. 
At the hearing on Young's Motion to Withdraw his Plea he was represented by 
Brook Sessions (R. 402). At the hearing counsel submitted the issue of withdrawing the 
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plea on the pleadings. The Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea 
attached as Exhibit 1. (Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07 pg. 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant demanded counsel file an appeal in this case. Defendant argues that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant believes his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. At the time the plea 
was entered he was suffering from a serious psychological condition, which caused him 
be unable to fully understand his rights and the consequences of his plea. Defendant 
spent over five hundred days in custody prior to sentencing. A majority of that time was 
at the Utah State Mental Hospital. Even when Mr. Young was finally found competent it 
was clear that he still did and does to this day believe that he is the biological son of Elvis 
Pressley. Mr. Young believes that he is in fact Jason Pressley. The only way the alienist 
was able to assert competency was to state that Mr. Young improved enough to 
compartmentalize in his mind whom he is and yet while under this misperception can 
meaningfully participate and understand the proceedings against him. (R. 337 Report 
from state mental hospital Dr. Spencer.) (Exhibit B). 
Mr. Young asserts that he was not informed of all of his constitutional rights either 
by the court at the entry of plea hearing or by his counsel prior to the hearing. Mr. Young 
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of his rights in terms 
he could understand. As a result, because his trial counsel was ineffective, his guilty plea 
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was not made knowingly or voluntarily and this court should reverse the trial court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw that plea. Defendant is upset that he was sentenced to 
prison rather than put on probation and into mental health court. Defendant is in need of 
further mental health treatment to address his ability to understand these proceedings and 
the requirements of our society. 
ARGUMENT 
YOUNG'S GUILTY PLEA WAS UNKNOWING AND 
INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AND 
THE COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6(2)(a) states that "A plea of guilty... may be 
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made." Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of 
pleas in criminal matters. Rule 11(e)(2) requires that all pleas be entered "voluntarily". 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and 
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). This burden "demands the utmost solicitude 
of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has 
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.'" Gibbons, 740 
R2d at 1312 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13 
(1969)). The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
This Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the 
trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996). "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court 
strictly complied with . . . procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness." Id. 
A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uniformed. State v. Breckenridge, 688 
R2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). Moreover, a trial court '"personally establish that the 
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights and understood the elements 
of the crime.' State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Maguire, 
830 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1991); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of the 
crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of the 
law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be 'truly voluntary.' State v. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969))." Thurrnan, 911 P.2dat 373. 
Even where the trial court complies with the requirements of Rule 11, "The 
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can spare a 
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defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the same case 
required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea was not knowing 
and voluntary. See State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (remanding the case to 
determine whether the defendant's original plea was knowing and voluntary where the 
facts suggest that the defendant "received nothing in return for his guilty plea" and 
"apparently received seriously deficient information from all persons involved in his 
case"). State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 13, 167 P.3d 1046. In addressing 
ineffectiveness claims in regards to the entry of guilty pleas, the Stricklandtest applies. 
See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,116, 26 P.3d 203 (following Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), which stated that "the two-part Strickland 
v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). See also State v. Roj as-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ^ 10, 125 P.3d 930. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Young asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court 
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn. Alternatively, he requests that the 
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matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that a hearing should be 
held on his second motion to withdraw his plea. 
SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 2008. 
BROOK SESSIONS 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
BROOK SESSIONS (6136) 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, ) OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
vs. ) PLEA 
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, ) CR.No. 061402072 
Aka Jason Presley ) 
Defendant. ) 
OoOoo 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea, is pending before this court. The 
following Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea is hereby 
submitted after review of the audio of the proceedings before Judge Gary D. Stott 
on June 14, 2007: 
1. Defendant's motion is based on U.C.A. §77-13-6, 1953 as amended. 
2. Defendant's plea was tendered June 14, 2007. Sentencing has not been 
imposed. 
3. The defendant contends that under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, the defendant is entitled to effective counsel on 
cases in which jail or prison may be imposed. Assumed in that right is 
the right to effective counsel. Defendant contends that his counsel did 
not adequately advise him of the rights he was giving up by entering a 
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guilty plea or the potential consequences of entering a guilty plea in 
these cases. 
4. Defendant contends that he did not fully understand all aspects of 
entering a plea and giving up his constitutional rights. 
5. The right to counsel is found in The United States Constitution and in 
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12 that provides an 
independent right of counsel. It is further granted pursuant to statute. 
U.C.A. 77-1-6(1 )(a). The defendant submits that a conviction obtained 
where ineffective counsel is present does not meet the requirements of 
the constitutions and of statute. 
6. The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant's right to 
rely on counsel as a medium between the defendant and the State 
attaches upon the initiation of the formal charges. Michigan v. Harvey, 
494 U.S. 344 (1990.) The right attaches even in misdemeanor cases, 
wherein a deprivation of liberty may ensue, and more so in a felony case. 
State v. Vincent, 845 P2d. 254 (Utah App. 1992). Argersinger v. 
Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Webster v. Jones. 587 P2d. 528 (Utah 
1978). State v.Vincent 845 P2d. 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
VIOLATIONS OF RULE ELEVEN 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure speaks to this issue of the right 
to counsel. It requires that counsel shall represent an accused, unless the defendant 
waives counsel in open court. The defendant cannot even be required to plead 
until he/she has had adequate time to confer with counsel. Rule 11(a). See also 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S. Ct 944, 79 L.Ed 2d 122 (1984); 
also OremCitvv. Bergstrorq 992 P.2d 991, 993-994 (Utah 1999). 
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In State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme 
Court advised: The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is a 
fundamental 
Constitutional right, which must be jealously protected by the trial court. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The Constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel 
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the 
accused—whose life or liberty is at stake—is without counsel. The 
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon 
the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and 
competent waiver by the accused. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S. 
CI 1019. 
See also Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969) and State 
v. Smith, 776P.2d 929 (Utah 1989). 
When taking a defendant's plea the court must strictly comply with Rule 
Eleven of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). Rule Eleven provides in relevant part: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
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(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sen tence , and i f 
a p p l i c a b l e , the minimum mandatory na tu re of the minimum sen tence , 
t h a t may be imposed for each offense t o which a p lea i s en t e r ed , 
i nc lud ing the p o s s i b i l i t y of the imposi t ion of consecu t ive 
s en t ences ; 
(6) i f the tendered p lea i s a r e s u l t of a p r i o r p lea d i s c u s s i o n 
and p lea agreement, and i f so , what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time l i m i t s for f i l i n g 
any motion t o withdraw the p l e a ; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised t h a t the r i g h t of appeal i s 
l i m i t e d . 
These f ind ings may be based on ques t ion ing of the defendant on 
the 
record or , i f used, a w r i t t e n s ta tement r e c i t i n g these f a c t o r s 
a f t e r the 
cour t has e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t he defendant has read, unders tood, and 
acknowledged the con ten t s of the s t a t ement . If the defendant 
cannot unders tand the Engl ish language, i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t h a t 
the s ta tement has been read or t r a n s l a t e d t o the defendant . 
Unless s p e c i f i c a l l y r equ i r ed by s t a t u t e or r u l e , a cour t i s not 
r e q u i r e d t o i n q u i r e i n t o or advise concerning any c o l l a t e r a l 
consequences of a p l e a . 
At the hearing on June 14, 2007 when the Defendant entered his plea the 
court engaged Mr. Young in a colloquy. Defendant submits that the colloquy did 
not strictly comply with Rule 11. Defendant was not advised that the maximum 
fine, which could be imposed of $5,000.00 on the third degree felony. He was not 
advised that the fine would include the 85% surcharge. Defendant was not advised 
that a court security fee could be imposed. Failure to do so makes the plea 
involuntary. State v. Thurmaa 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
Defendant was not formally advised of his right to counsel. Although 
counsel was appointed and present with the Defendant, Mr. Young maintains that 
his attorney did not effectively represent him and that Mr. Young should have been 
advised of his right to counsel. 
Mr. Young was not advised of his right to compel and confront witnesses. 
He was not specifically questioned about his understanding of his rights to require 
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the state to prove each and every element of the offenses against him. In fact, no 
factual basis for the plea was stated on the record. 
Mr. Young was not advised that by entering a plea he was giving up his 
right to an appeal. He was not told that by entering a plea he was limiting his 
appeal rights to only appealing the entry of the plea and the sentence that might be 
imposed. 
Mr. Young was not questioned to determine if he was under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol or suffering from a mental condition that precluded him from 
understanding the proceedings. In this case Mr. Young's mental condition is very 
relevant. Mr. Young believed at the time of the offense and still believes that his 
birth father is Elvis Pressley. Mr. Young believes his true name is Jason Pressley 
and that the world is involved in a conspiracy to prevent him from claiming all that 
he is due as a result of being the biological son of Elvis Pressley. Mr. Young has 
been found competent to proceed. This doesn't mean that he understands the 
proceedings against him. Mr. Young believes he is innocent and doesn't believe 
that the court should rely on his guilty plea to convict him. 
Mr. Young's plea was not voluntarily given and he should be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. State v. Thurmaa 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). Counsel has 
advised Mr. Young that a withdrawal of the plea is not a dismissal. Mr. Young 
understands that he will have to defend against each count individually. He believes 
it is in his best interest to do so because he believes that when he presents the 
evidence of his true identity the court will understand why he behaved as he did. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that he be allowed to 
withdraw his plea and that his case move forward to a jury trial. 
/ / day of StfH'^OZ, DATED this / / day of ,N yp ft: AVD*, , 2007 
B&boX j . sfessfdMs 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing on this / / day of Af/m,)t£H ~ 2007, by first-class, U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
Attention: Kent Morgan 
111 E Broadway Ste 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT B 
Competency Evaluation update by state hospital Dr. Spencer. 
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Department of Human Services 
LESA-MICHELB CHURCH 
EntCtith* Director 
Division of Substaace Abuse and Mental Health 
MARKL PAYNE 
Director 
Utah State Hospital 
DALLAS L. EARNSHAW 
Superintendent 
May 24,2007 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provor Utah 84601 
Re: Ernest John Young (aka Jason Piesley) 
Case#: 061402072 
Dear Judge: 
In accordance with Utah Code 77-15-6,1 have reviewed the data in the attached report by Robert F. Sawicki, Ph.D,* 
Based on this informafion, I certily that Ernest John Young is now Competent to stand trial. Should you require 
further information or testimony* the examiner would be the most knowledgeable source. 
Sincerely, 
Richard B. Spencer. MD 
Clinical Director 
Utah State Hospital 
Qualified examiners are appointed to perform these competency assessments. My involvement does not indude any 
personal contact with the defendant Therefore, my testimony in court may be of limited value. The findings and 
recommendations are those of the examining psychologist My role is to provide an administrative review to assure statutory 
elements are addressed and that the conclusions and recommendations are supported by the findings. 
t/~-
1300 East Center Streete Provo, Utah 84603-02701 Telephone (801) 344-4400 e F*x (801) 34M225 a www.uskwah^av 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, 
aka: Jason Presley 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 061402072 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
I, ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Degree 
Provision 
Influencing, Impeding, or Retaliating F3 




0-5 years in prison $5000 fine 
plus 85% surcharge $25 security 
fee 
1 
• Enhanceable Second Offense, (Only if checked.) 
I know and understand that if I am convicted in the future of this same crime, the second 
conviction will be a [Class Misdemeanor/ Degree Felony]. The maximum penalty for 
that crime is . 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
A. ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, on or about May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, did 
threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's official duties or 
with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of those 
official duties. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
On May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ernest John Young made several phone calls to 
Judge Hansen of the Third District Court, and threatened to execute him if he did not accept Mr. 
Young's Petition to Seek the Death Penalty and Law Suit, 
2 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is David A. Stewart. My 
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
(no contest) plea. 
Jury Trial I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me and b) my 
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against 
me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
3 
would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a 
jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that 
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or 
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. 
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set 
for trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the cost of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
4 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to 
which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record 
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
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Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea is the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
I will plead to Count 1 as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The State is not 
opposed to a 402 reduction of Count 1 to a Class A misdemeanor so long as I successfully , 
complete probation, "t^-*- £i>t4^L u^Ul reco</v\ Y^4^U£ H ^ ^ ^ f/y^JLS ^^^e-^c^-nK 
t o e S e w ^ f ah 4 ^ tx<^i/M hzcdi^ £ 0 ^ 4 . . C # 5 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentence concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
6 
I am ^SO years of age. I have attended school through ^ -grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which would impair 
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced, I understand that 
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea 
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made, I understand that any challenge 
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this (H**day of ^>*J*A-~ , 2007 
ERNEST JOHN YJ3U 
DEFENDANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, the defendant above, and 
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him 
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in 
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. /goST* 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ERNEST JOHN 
YOUNG, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered 
and that the acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest, 
8 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea is freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea to the crime 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
[T day of __^\(jM^i Dated this :    AllM^ ,2007. 
BY THE QOURT: 
I 
S7J$AM 
District Court Judge 
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